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NOTE

POSSIBLE RELIANCE: PROTECTING LEGALLY INNOCENT
JOHNSON CLAIMANTS
Keagan Potts*
The writ of habeas corpus presents the last chance for innocent defendants to
obtain relief from invalid convictions and sentences. The writ constitutes a
limited exception to the finality of judgments. Given the role finality plays in
conserving judicial resources and deterring criminal conduct, exceptions created by habeas must be principally circumscribed. Since the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in Johnson
v. United States, the federal courts of appeals have attempted to develop a
test that protects the writ from abuse by Johnson claimants.
This Note first contributes a new understanding of the resulting circuit split.
Currently, circuits construe the split to be about a Johnson petitioner’s burden of proof at the jurisdictional stage. However, circuits actually disagree on
the standard a petitioner must meet to establish the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. This Note identifies two standards. The sole-reliance standard requires petitioners to show that the sentencing court relied solely on the
residual clause, while the possible-reliance standard requires petitioners to
show that the court may have relied on the residual clause. Both standards
must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. This Note then deploys
this reconceptualization of the circuit split to advance new arguments in favor of imposing the possible-reliance standard at the jurisdictional stage. The
possible-reliance standard protects the innocent, preserves the finality of
judgments, and conforms with Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence and
congressional intent expressed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
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INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus is the last chance for those convicted to establish their innocence. As such, determining whether a petitioner can access
courts on the writ is a high-stakes inquiry. Granting habeas relief undermines confidence in the justice system to some degree, as it entails recognizing injustice done by institutional actors at previous stages of the
proceedings. 1 At the same time, however, the potential for habeas relief
stands as a testament to the justice system’s commitment to integrity. It provides petitioners an opportunity to recover from injustice that occurs despite
the system’s best efforts. 2
The Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States has significant
implications for habeas jurisprudence. 3 Samuel Johnson—the habeas claimant—was sentenced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
which allows enhanced sentences for defendants who “ship, possess, [or] receive firearms” if they also have three or more earlier convictions for violent
felonies. 4 Three clauses in the ACCA define “violent felonies,” but only one,

1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise
in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 426 (1961).
2. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980).
3. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); id. § 924(e)(1); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56.
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the residual cause, was at issue in Johnson. 5 The residual clause is a catchall:
it identifies crimes that “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another” as crimes of violence. 6
In Johnson, the Court determined that the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 7 The clause failed to
provide courts adequate direction in assessing when a past crime presented a
substantial enough “risk of physical injury to another” to warrant an enhanced sentence. 8 Consequently, enhanced sentences of thousands of prisoners charged under the ACCA’s residual clause have been called into
question. 9
Before a court may decide a habeas petition on the merits, the claimant
must show that the reviewing court has proper subject-matter jurisdiction to
review that petition at all. This Note addresses a circuit split regarding the
showing that Johnson claimants must make to establish a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction over their habeas claims. 10 So far, eight circuits have
weighed in on the issue. 11 Some courts characterize the split as a disagreement about whether habeas petitioners’ burden of proof is preponderance or
nonpreponderance. 12
This Note rejects that conceptualization of the split. Instead, it argues
that the split is better conceptualized as a disagreement as to the evidentiary
standard to which petitioners should be held. This understanding reflects the
fact that all circuits require petitioners to establish the reviewing court’s subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Some circuits
require petitioners to show that the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause in assigning an enhanced sentence (the “sole-reliance” standard). 13 Others require a showing that the sentence may have relied on the
5. Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) contains the elements clause, which defines crimes of violence as those that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force” against another. In addition to the residual clause, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) includes the enumerated-offenses clause, which singles out burglary, arson, and extortion and crimes that “involve[ the] use of explosives.”
6. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
7. 135 S. Ct. 2551.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
9. See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 59 (2015).
10. At the jurisdictional stage, “a court adjudicates preliminary procedural issues going
to whether the dispute over real-world facts and obligations can be resolved in this particular
court between these particular parties at this particular time.” Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 649 (2005). A court has subject-matter jurisdiction
when it has the constitutional or statutory power to resolve the petitioner’s case. Id. at 650. At
the merits stage, the court determines whether there are any factual disputes to be resolved at
trial. Id. at 652–55.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 234, 241–42 (1st Cir. 2018); Potter v.
United States, 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 2018); see also infra Section II.B.
13. See, e.g., Dimott, 881 F.3d at 234, 241–42; Potter, 887 F.3d at 787.
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residual clause (the “possible-reliance” standard). 14 Courts in the latter camp
use the sole-reliance standard when they are conducting review on the merits.
This circuit split implicates themes prevalent in the broader conversation about sentencing reform. On the one hand, the split presents an opportunity to mitigate the effect long sentences have on mass incarceration. 15
Reformers argue that because the likelihood of criminality declines as an individual gets older, sentences can be shortened without putting people in
danger. 16 On the other hand, antireformers point to the low success rate of
habeas claims, suggesting that resources spent reviewing meritless habeas
claims could be better used elsewhere. 17 Antireformers also worry that
broader habeas review will inhibit the law’s ability to incapacitate and deter
violent criminals. 18 In light of this debate, a viable solution to this circuit
split must balance innocence against the advantages traditionally attributed
to finality: deterrence, incapacitation, and the conservation of judicial resources.
This Note argues that courts should ask whether a petitioner’s sentence
may have relied on the residual clause at the jurisdictional stage and reserve
the question of whether her sentence solely relied on the residual clause for
the merits stage. This allows the writ of habeas corpus to free the innocent
without undermining finality. Part I provides background on habeas relief,
the ACCA, and the Court’s recent decisions in Johnson v. United States 19 and

14. See, e.g., United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th
Cir. 2017); Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1224 (11th Cir. 2017). In Beeman, the court
considered the merits of Beeman’s claim as an alternative grounds of affirming the lower
court’s dismissal, which suggests it somewhat equivocally followed the possible-reliance standard. Had the court stringently applied the sole-reliance standard, it would have dismissed the
claim as untimely without reviewing the merits. This Note focuses primarily on the proper inquiry at the jurisdictional stage.
15. See New Report: Rise of Extreme Sentences Drives Mass Incarceration in Washington,
ACLU (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/new-report-rise-extremesentences-drives-mass-incarceration-washington [https://perma.cc/JS7Z-9NR9].
16. Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of Punishment, 87
UMKC L. REV. 113, 122 (2018).
17. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 284
(2006) (finding that 1 percent of state habeas claimants were successful); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting the possibility of a predisposition
against habeas petitions given the small proportion that are meritorious).
18. 142 CONG. REC. 7798 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“[V]iolent crime has been
one of the worst problems faced by the people of our country for several years.”). But see John
Gramlich, 5 Facts About Crime in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/17/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc
/BU9Q-Y53E] (indicating that, contrary to the public perception that violent crime is high, the
violent crime rate has been dropping steadily since the early nineties).
19. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (finding that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague).
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Welch v. United States. 20 Part II reconceptualizes the existing circuit split as a
disagreement concerning different evidentiary standards rather than different evidentiary burdens. Part III identifies shortcomings of the sole-reliance
standard and argues instead for adopting the possible-reliance standard. Enforcing possible reliance at the jurisdictional stage strikes the best balance
between finality and innocence.
I.

HABEAS CORPUS, THE AEDPA, AND THE ACCA

Prisoners’ access to habeas corpus relief has fluctuated throughout
American history. 21 Section I.A locates the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a statute that limits the availability of habeas
relief, within the broader history of the writ of habeas corpus and describes
its effect on the writ. 22 Section I.B discusses the ACCA and the Supreme
Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, flagging the particular difficulties Johnson claimants face. 23
A. The Great Writ of Liberty
Habeas is the “great writ of liberty.” 24 It plays a crucial role in protecting
people from arbitrary or wrongful imprisonment by providing them a means
of collaterally challenging their convictions and sentences. A habeas petitioner may challenge her sentence on the grounds that her conviction (1) violates the Constitution, (2) was imposed by a court lacking jurisdiction, (3)
exceeded the maximum sentence outlined by the laws, or (4) is otherwise
subject to collateral attack. 25 On the merits, a petitioner generally must make
one of the four aforementioned showings by a preponderance of the evidence. 26

20. 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (granting prisoners the right to collaterally attack sentences
founded upon the residual clause).
21. See DUKER, supra note 2, at 3–8 (providing a history of habeas corpus relief and analyzing the impact political struggles had on the writ).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
23. 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
24. DUKER, supra note 2, at 3. The writ has been a central feature of the U.S. criminal
justice system since the Founding era. The Judiciary Act of 1789 made habeas review in federal
courts available to federal prisoners. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. In the Force Bill of
1833, Congress made the writ available to prisoners in state custody as well. The Force Bill, ch.
57, 4 Stat. 632 (1833). Now, state prisoners often bring their habeas claims in the federal district court in the district in which they are in custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). E.g.,
Dickey v. Davis, 231 F. Supp. 3d 634, 652, 659 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
26. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 34 (1992). One exception to the preponderance standard
occurs when a habeas claim is based on an unreasonable factual determination. In such cases,
courts require a higher showing—that the sentencing court’s decision was made according to
an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); e.g.,
Noguera v. Davis, 290 F. Supp. 3d 974, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
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Challenges to a prisoner’s sentence are best understood as requests for
collateral, rather than direct, review. 27 Direct review of a criminal conviction
entails “review [conducted] in the ‘same proceeding’ ” before the judgment
becomes final. 28 Collateral review, as traditionally understood, constitutes a
separate proceeding investigating aspects of the initial proceeding and can
begin only after direct review is complete. 29 Of late, the Supreme Court and
Congress have limited the availability of habeas as a vehicle for direct review,
reserving it for prisoners collaterally attacking their sentences. 30 This Note
focuses on Johnson as a means of collaterally attacking a sentence.
The scope of the writ has fluctuated throughout history. 31 The past few
decades have seen the writ judicially 32 and legislatively narrowed. 33 In part,
this narrowing occurred in response to growing worries that guilty prisoners
were using habeas corpus to escape their sentences. 34 As the federal prison

27. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 940 (7th ed. 2016) (“[F]ederal court
consideration of the habeas corpus petition is not considered a direct review of the state court
decision; rather, the petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed in federal court and is termed
‘collateral relief.’ ”). Habeas petitioners may challenge the legality of a court’s application of
federal or state laws. See supra note 24. Additionally, habeas can be used to challenge both convictions and sentences. See Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L.
REV. 417, 436–37 (2018). However, this Note focuses on the writ as a means of attacking sentences specifically because that is how Johnson claimants employ the writ.
28. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 470 (2006).
29. Id. at 471.
30. See id. at 470. One of the ways Congress limited habeas to direct review is to require
that petitioners either exhaust state remedies or show that the state’s corrective process is nonexistent or ineffective. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
31. The writ reached its height under the Warren Court after a period of gradual expansion throughout the early twentieth century. See Neil D. McFeeley, The Supreme Court and the
Federal System: Federalism from Warren to Burger, PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM, Fall 1978, at 5, 13;
see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the right against selfincrimination requires certain warnings to be given upon arrest); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 327 (1915) (seeking to ensure the adequacy of the appeals process provided to the defendant).
32. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (limiting the applicability of cases
decided after the defendant’s conviction to two exceptional circumstances). Cases decided after
a petitioner’s conviction can only be considered if “(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a
‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceeding.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quoting Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
33. See, e.g., AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
34. This concern has received significant attention in the past decades. See, e.g., 142
CONG. REC. 7791 (1996) (statement of Sen. Warner); Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive?
Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2090–91 (2014). This increased
attention is in part due to the creation of new federal crimes throughout the 1980s and ’90s and
the subsequent increase in the federal prison population. See Brian W. Walsh, Doing Violence
to the Law: The Over-Federalization of Crime, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 9, 2011),
https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/doing-violence-the-law-the-overfederalization-crime [https://perma.cc/M69G-DLB8].
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population increased during the late twentieth century, so did prison litigation; much of that litigation was filed by prisoners seeking a writ of habeas
corpus. 35 In 1996, Congress reacted by passing the AEDPA to eliminate
nonmeritorious suits early and often. 36 However, Congress’s overzealous approach risks keeping too many meritorious claims out of court. 37
The AEDPA aims to weed out nonmeritorious suits by erecting various
procedural hurdles. Two provisions in particular present substantial obstacles to petitioners. The statute bars petitioners from both applying for relief
multiple times and bringing claims more than one year after their judgment
becomes final. 38 While these bars have exceptions, their allowances are narrow. The bar on successive petitions applies to claims “presented in a prior
application” with two narrow exceptions: (1) claims based on a new retroactive rule of constitutional law and (2) claims based on facts that could not
have been discovered previously through due diligence. 39 Petitioners bringing successive petitions can only file in a district court if a three-judge panel
of the court of appeals determines that they have made a prima facie showing that their petition fits within one of those two exceptions. 40
To obtain an exception to the time bar, a petitioner bringing her claim
more than a year after her judgment became final must show either that (1)
newly discovered evidence clearly establishes her innocence and the evidence
could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence;
or (2) her claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” 41 Accordingly the statutory bar is still enforced, but it begins to run on the date that a new constitu-

35. Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org
/criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/6XZA-NUUM]; Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner
Litigation, as the PLRA Approaches 20, 28 CORR. L. REP. 69, 72 (2017).
36. See Blume, supra note 17, at 270–71. In the same year it passed the AEDPA, Congress also restricted prisoners’ ability to bring civil claims with the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PLRA). Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-71 to -73 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). The PLRA makes it both harder to file and harder to
win civil claims by requiring administrative exhaustion, allowing the court to dismiss frivolous
and malicious claims sua sponte, limiting the amount of attorneys’ fees that are recoverable,
and restricting prisoners’ ability to bring claims for mental or emotional injury. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e; see also Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood,
5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153 (2015); Know Your Rights: The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upload_file79_25805.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PJB3-2XT7] (“[The PLRA] makes it harder for prisoners to file lawsuits in federal
court.”).
37. Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 2 (2016); Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 139, 140 (2008).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (d)(1).
39. Id. § 2244(b)(1)–(2).
40. Id. § 2244(b)(3).
41. Id. § 2244(b)(2); see also id. § 2255(h).
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tional rule was made retroactive by the Supreme Court rather than on the
date that the petitioner’s conviction became final. The time bar and its exceptions apply to both initial petitions and properly brought successive petitions. 42 The AEDPA applies these additional procedural restrictions to
“provide justice for victims” 43 and ensure a greater degree of finality. 44 Congress intended the AEDPA’s constraints on habeas claimants to apply only to
the extent that they would not overburden innocent petitioners seeking relief. 45
B. Johnson Claims and the ACCA
While the federal habeas statutes, revised by the AEDPA, provide a procedural vehicle for prisoners’ relief, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the
ACCA’s residual clause in Johnson v. United States provides the substantive
grounds. Originally passed in 1984, the ACCA seeks to incapacitate dangerous repeat offenders more effectively by providing enhanced sentences on
the basis of previous convictions. 46 Therefore, sentencing enhancement under the ACCA requires three prior convictions, each of which must be a
crime of violence punishable by more than one year to make the defendant
eligible for a sentencing enhancement. 47 Three provisions define crimes of
violence: (1) the elements clause, which requires that the prior offenses have
“as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force”
against another; 48 (2) the enumerated-offenses clause, which singles out burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes that “involve [the] use of explosives”; 49
and (3) the residual clause, which encompasses all crimes that “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” 50

42. See id. § 2244(d)(1).
43. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1214 (1996).
44. Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2003).
45. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, at A170 (1946).
46. See The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 2312 Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. L. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 6–7 (1986) (statement of
Rep. Wyden). The ACCA has been amended three times since 1984: the first two amendments
occurred in 1986, first to adjust the statute’s definition of burglary and then, more importantly,
to broaden the prior offenses eligible for sentence enhancement under the ACCA so as to incapacitate even more repeat offenders. 132 CONG. REC. 7697 (1986) (statement of Sen. Specter);
Kayleigh E. McGlynn, Incapacitating Dangerous Repeat Offenders (or Not): Evidentiary Restrictions on Armed Career Criminal Act Sentencing in United States v. King, 59 B.C. L. REV.
348, 352–53 (2018).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). This provision also applies to those with three previous convictions for a serious drug offense. Id.
48. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The elements clause is also referred to as “the force clause.”
49. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
50. Id.
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In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the residual
clause was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 51
Samuel Johnson, the petitioner, pled guilty to a felony possession charge after showing firearms to undercover agents. 52 The government pursued an
enhanced sentence under the ACCA, arguing that Johnson’s previous conviction for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun constituted a violent crime under the residual clause. 53
According to the Court, the residual clause was unconstitutionally vague
for two reasons. 54 First, the clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.” 55 Prior to Johnson, a court applying the residual clause would begin its analysis by imagining an abstract “ordinary
case” of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. 56 The court would
then decide whether this “ordinary case” constituted a crime of violence that
should trigger the ACCA’s sentence enhancements. Without considering the
particular facts of the defendant’s conviction, however, the court would
struggle to define the “ordinary case” of any given crime. 57 The Johnson
Court explained that the residual clause offered “no reliable way to choose
between . . . competing accounts of what [conduct the] ‘ordinary’ ” crime involved. 58
Second, even once the court defined the ordinary case, the residual
clause left too much uncertainty regarding the amount of risk a crime must
create to constitute a violent felony. 59 When the “serious potential risk” inquiry was applied to the judicially imagined “ordinary case,” the statute gave
insufficient guidance to courts and failed to provide adequate notice of what
conduct it punished. 60 Less than a year after Johnson, the Court held in
Welch v. United States that Johnson applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 61 As a result, those convicted under the residual clause could
challenge their sentences through habeas, provided they brought their Johnson claim within one year of the Court’s decision in Welch.
A more fine-grained understanding of innocence is necessary to understand the precise nature of the circuit split advanced in the next Section. Innocence comes in two varieties: factual innocence and legal innocence.

51. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
52. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2557.
55. Id. at 2557–58.
56. Id. Notably this imagined “ordinary case” is completely divorced from the facts of
the defendant’s case.
57. See id. at 2557–58.
58. Id. at 2558.
59. Id.
60. The Court suggested this standard might be workable if it were applied to real-world
facts. See id. at 2557–58.
61. 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).
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Petitioners assert factual innocence when they provide new evidence that reveals they did not commit the act of which they were convicted. 62 When petitioners assert legal innocence, however, they admit to committing the act of
which they are accused, but they dispute that the act was itself a crime. Those
claiming legal innocence argue they were convicted under an invalid statute. 63 Thus, all claims based on the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the residual clause in Johnson are legal innocence claims. 64 Importantly, courts
recognize both varieties of innocence as grounds for collateral relief. 65
II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE PROBLEMS WITH PREPONDERANCE

The debate about the appropriate standard for Johnson claims is a recent
installment in a longer historical conversation about balancing the interest in
finality against the competing interest in fundamental fairness. 66 On the one
hand, Johnson claims might test courts’ ability to prevent people with criminal convictions from manipulating the writ to avoid their enhanced sentence
through a technicality, despite being factually guilty of a crime. 67 On the other hand, the habeas statutes as revised by the AEDPA might be ill-suited to
provide a remedy to legally innocent petitioners under Johnson. 68
Section II.A begins by explaining how the courts understand the circuit
split and identifying problems this conceptualization creates. Currently, the
circuits describe their disagreement as one about the evidentiary burden that
a Johnson petitioner must satisfy at the jurisdictional stage (whether petitioners prevail on a showing by the preponderance of the evidence or something less). Next, Section II.B argues that the split is better understood as a
disagreement on what evidentiary standard Johnson petitioners should be
held to at the jurisdictional stage (whether petitioners must show that the

62. Litman, supra note 27, at 419.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 445.
65. See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268; Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563; DNA Exonerations in the
United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-inthe-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/7P9F-VLU8] (providing fast facts about DNA exonerations, which are cases of factual innocence, in the United States).
66. For instance, the Warren Court gave fundamental fairness primacy, as evidenced by
its establishment of procedural protections as grounds for subsequent habeas relief. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (holding that people have a right to counsel at lineups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (indicating that the right against
self-incrimination requires certain warnings to be given upon arrest). Conversely, the Burger,
Roberts, and Rehnquist Courts focused on finality in narrowing habeas relief. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 27, at 951–52.
67. See 142 CONG. REC. 7791–92 (1996) (statement of Sen. Warner) (declaring that under the AEDPA “habeas corpus appeals will be reformed: death row inmates will no longer be
allowed to drag out their appeals for several decades”).
68. See 142 CONG. REC. 7784 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing that the
AEDPA achieves the reprehensible goal of “den[ying] meaningful habeas corpus review to
State death row inmates”).
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sentencing court solely relied on the residual clause or, instead, that the sentencing court may have relied on the residual clause). Importantly, this Note
argues that regardless of whether circuits endorse the sole-reliance or possible-reliance standard, they all require the petitioner to make her showing by
a preponderance of the evidence.
A. The Circuits’ Understanding of the Split: Preponderance v.
Nonpreponderance
After Welch made Johnson available as a basis for habeas relief, a circuit
split emerged regarding what standards to impose on Johnson claimants at
the jurisdictional and merits stages. 69 Some circuits understand the split as a
debate about whether to enforce the preponderance burden at the jurisdictional stage. 70 Under this conception, courts on one side of the split enforce
the preponderance standard while courts on the other side of the split adopt
a burden of proof on defendants that is lower than a preponderance. 71
Dimott v. United States provides a paradigmatic example of a court’s
implementation of the preponderance/nonpreponderance distinction followed by the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. 72 In Dimott, Charles Casey,
one of the petitioners, argued that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction
over his Johnson claim because he had filed within a year of the date Johnson
became retroactively applicable. 73 He supported the assertion that he relied
on Johnson by showing that the sentencing record was silent with respect to

69. Circuits also disagree on what it means for movants to rely on Johnson and whether
movants may rely on post-sentencing case law in their Johnson claims. Compare In re Hires,
825 F.3d 1297, 1302–04 (11th Cir. 2016) (prohibiting defendants from relying on postsentencing case law to prove a Johnson claim), with United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 227
(3d Cir. 2018) (permitting a Johnson petitioner to rely on post-sentencing case law).
70. See, e.g., Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 240–42 (1st Cir. 2018).
71. Id. at 241–242.
72. Id.; Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019) (“This court rejected the Fourth and Ninth circuits’ approaches that require showing only that a sentencing
court ‘may have’ relied on the residual clause.”); Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680, 684–85
(6th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Potter v. United States, 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 2018) (dismissing the petition at the jurisdictional stage because “[n]either the presentence report nor
the sentencing transcript shows that the district court relied on the residual clause or, to be
more precise, relied only on the residual clause”). But see Williams v. United States, 927 F.3d
427, 439 n.7 (6th Cir. 2019) (limiting enforcement of the preponderance standard to cases
where there is “affirmative evidence that the sentencing court sentenced the movant under a
clause other than the residual clause” suggesting that the Sixth Circuit might impose a standard
below the preponderance standard if there is no such affirmative evidence).
73. Dimott, 881 F.3d at 238–40. Recall that the time bar destroys federal courts’ subjectmatter jurisdiction over claims brought more than a year after the initial sentence or a year
after the date the new rule of constitutional law was made retroactively applicable. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d). Casey filed more than a year after his conviction became final, so the only way he
could establish the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was to show he was entitled to an exception to the time bar.
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which of the three ACCA clauses supported his enhanced sentence. 74 The
First Circuit rejected Casey’s argument and found that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction because he had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court had relied on the residual clause. 75 The court
“[p]lac[ed] the burden of proof and production on habeas petitioners,”
which it suggested accorded with First Circuit precedent and the goals of the
AEDPA. 76 On this reasoning, the mistake made by nonpreponderance circuits is that they “shift[] the burden of proof onto the Government,” and
thereby “irreparably undermine[]” the presumption of finality. 77 The next
Section identifies the shortcomings of this conceptualization and provides a
clearer characterization of the circuit split.
B. A Neater Distinction: Possible Reliance v. Sole Reliance
Before proceeding, some clarifications about the possible-reliance standard are in order. 78 The First Circuit’s use of the preponderance/nonpreponderance distinction provides a good example of the
distinction’s shortcomings. 79 In Dimott, the petitioner claimed that he was
entitled to habeas relief under Johnson because the sentencing court’s record
did not specify which of the three ACCA provisions supported his enhanced
sentence. 80 The First Circuit held that the petitioner’s claim did not properly
rely on Johnson because he could not show that “it is more likely than not
that he was sentenced solely pursuant to ACCA’s residual clause.” 81 Accordingly, the court concluded that it had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the
petitioner’s habeas claim. But the court failed to realize that the petitioner
was not arguing for a lighter burden of proof. Instead, he was arguing that
the correct standard is possible reliance and that, by showing that the sentencing record was silent, he had shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that the sentencing court may have relied on the residual clause.
The approach that the Dimott court characterizes as nonpreponderance
is better understood as the possible-reliance standard. The Third, Fourth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits find that the petitioner has established
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction if she shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that her sentence “may have been predicated” on the residual
74. Dimott, 881 F.3d at 240.
75. Id. at 240, 243.
76. Id. at 242.
77. See id. at 241–43.
78. See Ryan Baker, Note, Dimott v. United States: Requiring Petitioners Prove that Sentence Enhancement More Likely than Not Resulted from the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Residual Clause, 52 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 193 (2019) (criticizing the Fourth and Ninth Circuit
approaches for not enforcing preponderance, without recognizing that these circuits enforce
preponderance at the jurisdictional stage).
79. See, e.g., Dimott, 881 F.3d at 241.
80. Id. at 238.
81. Id. at 243.
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clause. 82 The Ninth Circuit’s implementation of the possible-reliance standard in United States v. Geozos is exemplary. 83 Like the sentencing record in
Dimott, David Geozos’s sentencing record failed to indicate “whether [the
court] found any or all of [his] convictions to qualify as a conviction for a
violent felony under the residual clause of ACCA.” 84 In light of his ambiguous sentencing record, Geozos argued that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction under Johnson. 85 Rather than construe Geozos’s argument as a
request for a lesser burden of proof, the Ninth Circuit realized that Geozos
was arguing for the possible-reliance standard. 86 The court found Geozos
had established its subject-matter jurisdiction because he had shown that it
was unclear whether the sentencing court had relied on the residual clause—
in other words, that the court may have relied on the residual clause. 87
The use of “preponderance” and “nonpreponderance” causes significant
confusion. Instead, this Note argues that the possible-reliance/sole-reliance
distinction better captures the circuits’ disagreement. It highlights the relevant similarities between the circuits’ approaches and more precisely locates
the differences. Both standards identify what showing habeas petitioners
must make at the jurisdictional stage to prove that her claim relies on Johnson. 88 Both standards require petitioners to show they are more likely than
not entitled to relief. Recall that under the possible-reliance standard, courts
only have subject-matter jurisdiction if the petitioner shows that her sentence more likely than not possibly relied on the residual clause. 89 Accordingly, possible reliance still requires petitioners to show they are entitled to
relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The circuits disagree on what
standard should be enforced at the jurisdictional stage—not whether the
burden of proof on petitioners is preponderance. 90 The dispute is about pos82. United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 223 (3d Cir. 2018); Beeman v. United States,
871 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017) (resolving the petitioner’s claim at the merits stage because he failed to meet the sole-reliance standard); United States v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122,
1126–28 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017).
83. 870 F.3d 890.
84. Geozos, 870 F.3d at 893.
85. See id. at 894.
86. See id. at 896.
87. Id. at 897.
88. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
90. Compare Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 243 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that the
petition is time-barred unless the petitioner establishes “that it is more likely than not that he
was sentenced solely pursuant to ACCA’s residual clause”), with United States v. Winston, 850
F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a petitioner’s claim relies on Johnson when her
“sentence may have been predicated on application of the now-void residual clause”), and
Geozos, 870 F.3d at 896–97 (“We therefore hold that, when it is unclear whether a sentencing
court relied on the residual clause in finding that a defendant qualified as an armed career
criminal, but it may have, the defendant’s § 2255 claim ‘relies on’ the constitutional rule announced in Johnson II.”).
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sible or sole reliance, rather than whether or not a preponderance of the evidence is the applicable burden of proof, so the First Circuit’s argument that
its approach better promotes finality is premised on a false assumption. 91
It is a little more difficult to determine whether circuits disagree about
the standard at the merits stage, when the courts determine whether the sentencing court’s error actually prejudiced the defendant. 92 The circuits also
seem to be divided on what standard to apply at the merits stage. Some
courts appear to require the petitioner to prove that the sentencing court
more likely than not relied solely on the residual clause. 93 Other courts appear to shift the burden of proof to the government once the petitioner
makes the jurisdictional showing. 94 The government must then identify an
alternative ACCA provision that could support the petitioner’s sentence by a
preponderance of the evidence. The confusion arises in part from the nature
of Johnson claims: because there is no new trial—reviewing courts only consider sentencing court documents—it is not always clear which party must
shoulder the burden of proof. 95 Moreover, courts thus far seem to be able to
fully resolve Johnson claims on the merits without articulating that they have
relied on a presumption tie-breaker. 96 In other words, the case law that
courts rely on in adjudicating the merits almost always clearly determines
whether the enhanced sentence could be upheld under a different, valid
clause of the ACCA. Accordingly, courts do not need to resort to burden
shifting to adjudicate Johnson cases. This Note does not seek to resolve this
area of disagreement among the circuits.
III. POSSIBLE RELIANCE BALANCES INNOCENCE AND FINALITY
This Part argues that the sole-reliance standard overemphasizes rigid
adherence to the AEDPA’s procedural bars and shifts the focus away from a
substantive inquiry to the petitioner’s innocence. 97 The AEDPA’s procedural
bars are only justified insofar as they can distinguish between meritorious

91. See infra Section III.B.
92. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
93. E.g., Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017).
94. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
95. See Geozos, 870 F.3d at 901 (holding that the “[d]efendant is entitled to relief” without indicating whether the defendant carries his burden, or the state failed to carry its burden).
96. Compare United States v. Snyder, 871 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2017) (affirming defendant’s sentence), with Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing defendant’s sentence).
97. See Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty?
Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Trade-Offs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 264 (Daniel S.
Medwed ed., 2017).
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and nonmeritorious claims—they are simply not justifiable when the petitioner’s guilt has been sufficiently called into question. 98
Section III.A begins by identifying the arguments in favor of the solereliance standard. Next, Section III.B illustrates the shortcomings of the solereliance standard. Finally, Section III.C argues in support of applying the
possible-reliance standard at the jurisdictional stage for Johnson claims by
showing that it conforms with congressional intent and Supreme Court
precedent. 99 Under the approach advocated by this Note, the petitioner
should only have to demonstrate that the sentencing record is unclear as to
whether the court relied on the residual clause to proceed to the merits.
Then, in reviewing the merits, the court can consider a broader range of evidence to decide if the defendant was actually sentenced under the residual
clause.
A. Sole Reliance and Its Justification
Circuits using the sole-reliance standard emphasize finality of judgment
as a dominant concern when reviewing habeas petitions and argue that sole
reliance best promotes this concern. 100 These circuits suggest that the key
advantage of the sole-reliance standard is that it reinforces finality by pre-

98. In sorting out nonmeritorious claims, the procedural requirements also encourage
the defense to bring all available arguments before the court when the evidence is still fresh and
leave more decisions to state, rather than federal, courts. That said, the Welch Court reasoned
that, in Johnson cases, these benefits could be foregone in the interest of ensuring the validity of
sentences imposed pursuant to the residual clause. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257
(2016).
99. Some circuits appear to go even further than this, shifting the burden to the state at
the merits stage once petitioners have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court may have relied on the residual clause. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits appear to
require the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentence could be supported by the enumerated-offense clause or elements clause at the merits stage. See United
States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 895
(9th Cir. 2017). This burden-shifting approach is not unheard of in habeas claims. For instance, once a petitioner challenging jury corruption by outside influence establishes that a jury
was contacted by an outsider, a heavy burden is placed on the state to show that this contact
did not prejudice the petitioner. Rodriguez v. Duckworth, 565 F. Supp. 989, 992 (N.D. Ind.
1983), aff’d, 746 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1984) (unpublished table decision). Additionally, in cases
where a petitioner challenges his acquiescence to surrendering his right to counsel, the state
initially carries the burden and is required to show that he was advised of and legitimately
waived his right. United States ex rel. Jefferson v. Fay, 364 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1966). While
there is some reason to think the burden-shifting approach is justified, it poses a substantially
higher risk to finality and deterrence than the approach defended in this Note. Accordingly,
more work needs to be done to assess whether burden shifting conforms with congressional
intent and balances the competing values at stake in habeas corpus petitions. The viability of
the burden-shifting approach is reserved for another project.
100. See, e.g., Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 240 (1st Cir. 2018) (suggesting that
allowing petitioners to prevail on any lower a standard would undercut the “animating principle of AEDPA: the presumption of finality”).
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serving the distinction between direct and collateral review. 101 Fortifying finality promotes deterrence and incapacitation 102 and conserves judicial resources. 103
To understand how the sole-reliance standard is supposed to promote
finality, it is essential to highlight the difference between direct and collateral
review. A final decision ends the period of direct review. A prisoner’s conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies certiorari or grants
certiorari and affirms the conviction on the merits or when the limitation
period for filing for certiorari runs out. 104 Generally, the state is presumed at
this point to have sufficiently shown that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. 105 This means all evidence and reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of the state and the defendant “must undertake the burden of
overturning them.” 106 It also means that “an error that may justify reversal
on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final
judgment,” because the grounds for overturning a sentence on collateral review are narrower than those available on direct review. 107 Challenges to sentences after the judgment becomes final are collateral, separate proceedings
that allege an error in the original trial and appeals process.
Maintaining the traditional distinction between collateral and direct review helps promote finality by making it more difficult for petitioners to obtain relief on collateral review because judgments are presumed to be legally
valid once they become final (i.e., susceptible only to collateral, not direct,
review). 108 This distinction encourages petitioners to be proactive during
their direct appeals and helps preserve scarce judicial resources by establishing an end point for litigation. 109 The grounds for relief are narrower on collateral review, and facts and reasonable inferences are drawn against the
petitioner, so they have a substantial incentive to be diligent during the direct-appeals process. The sole-reliance standard aims to promote finality af-

101. See, e.g., id. at 241–42; see also Baker, supra note 78, at 198 (relying on the important
ends promoted by separating direct review from collateral attack). See supra notes 28–30 and
accompanying text for more on the differences between direct and collateral review.
102. Dimott, 881 F.3d at 240 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)); see also
142 CONG. REC. 7803 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I have been fighting, along with crime
victims across our Nation, for the enactment of this legislation for nearly 20 years. Finally, heinous criminals will no longer be able to thwart justice and avoid just punishment by filing frivolous appeals for years on end.”).
103. See Baker, supra note 78, at 212.
104. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 532 (2003); see also Jimenez v. Quarterman,
555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009) (holding that direct review concludes only when the availability of
direct appeal to state or federal courts has been exhausted).
105. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 170 (1982).
106. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 153, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2020).
107. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979); see also supra notes 24–26 and
accompanying text.
108. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308–09 (1989).
109. See Baker, supra note 78, at 200.
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ter the exhaustion of direct review by requiring a more substantial showing
from habeas petitioners. In comparison to the possible-reliance standard, it
is more difficult to show that a sentence did rely on the residual clause than
it is to show that it may have. This is illustrated by petitioners like Geozos
and Casey: a silent or ambiguous record satisfies possible reliance, but not
sole reliance. 110 Proponents of the sole-reliance standard argue this makes it
consistent with the rest of habeas jurisprudence insofar as it makes collateral
relief sufficiently hard to obtain. 111
Critics of the possible-reliance standard argue that, by allowing collateral
challenges on a showing that the underlying conviction may have been tainted by the alleged error, the standard blurs the distinction between collateral
and direct review. 112 On this view, possible reliance construes ambiguity regarding whether an error has occurred in favor of the petitioner—which is
more akin to direct review than collateral, where inferences are supposed to
be drawn against the petitioner. 113 Finality is furthered only by a distinction
that makes relief significantly more difficult to obtain on collateral review
than on direct.
By better protecting finality, the sole-reliance standard promotes deterrence and incapacitation. 114 Many argue that “[w]ithout finality, the criminal
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” 115 They assert that an increase in the amount of successful habeas claims will decrease the disincentives of incarceration by making it less likely that people with criminal
convictions will have to serve their entire sentence. 116 Arguments relying on
the value of deterrence also draw on broader congressional intent in passing
the AEDPA. For instance, when considering the law, one senator voiced
concerns that “[a]buse of the writ of habeas corpus has led to the death penalty being not an effective deterrent, but a mockery.” 117
The sole-reliance standard also furthers the criminal justice system’s interest in incapacitating dangerous criminals. A lower burden supposedly increases the risk that meritless petitions will be granted, allowing dangerous
criminals to reenter society earlier by shortening their sentence. A higher
burden and additional procedural bars purportedly mitigate these worries. 118
110. See supra Section II.B.
111. See Baker, supra note 78, at 209–10.
112. Id. at 211.
113. Id. at 214.
114. Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 240 (1st Cir. 2018); Beeman v. United States,
871 F.3d 1215, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017).
115. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989); see also Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1223 (quoting
Teague); Dimott, 881 F.3d at 240 (same).
116. See Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1223 (positing that a lower standard “would go a long way
toward creating a presumption of non-finality and undermine the important interests that finality protects”).
117. 142 CONG. REC. 7798 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter).
118. See 142 CONG. REC. 7785 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Capital punishment
reform, death penalty reform, something that has been needed for years, decades. It is being
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Moreover, the importance of incapacitation is often more salient in cases of
legal innocence, where “no valid criminal statute prohibited the defendant’s
conduct,” rather than factual innocence, where petitioners argue that they
did not carry out the wrongful act for which they were convicted. 119 The goal
of incapacitation is defeated where a petitioner prevails under a theory of legal innocence and has her sentence vacated, despite having committed an act
that society has deemed immoral. 120
Finally, those endorsing the sole-reliance standard suggest it conserves
scarce judicial resources. 121 Some commentators go so far as to argue that the
flood of meritless habeas claims is the most egregious issue with collateral
attack. 122 Limiting collateral claims allows courts’ resources to be diverted to
potentially meritorious claims. 123 In passing the AEDPA, Congress was clear
that it was motivated by a desire to preserve judicial resources. 124 Indeed,
judges are concerned that they are becoming predisposed toward dismissal
because of the high volume of meritless habeas claims they review. 125
That said, judges are beginning to recognize that the AEDPA may have
overcorrected. 126 The AEDPA’s stringent limitations on who receives habeas
review make the possibility of erroneously rejecting a meritorious petition all

abused all over the country. There are better than 3,000 people who have been living on death
row for years with the sentences never carried out, the victims going through the pain every
time they turn around.”).
119. Litman, supra note 27, at 419, 451. Litman uses a hypothetical to support the claim
that legal innocence cases have different moral valence than factual innocence cases:
Imagine, for example, a legally innocent defendant who robbed a bank, but carried
with him a fake gun rather than a real one, such that the crime didn’t amount to
armed robbery under the relevant statute. By contrast, the most common example of
a factually innocent defendant would be a defendant who was at home watching a
movie instead of robbing a bank.
Id. at 451.
120. Id. at 451.
121. See Baker, supra note 78, at 210–12.
122. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148 (1970).
123. See 142 CONG. REC. 7792 (1996) (statement of Sen. Warner) (voicing the concern
that habeas reform ought to both preserve fair review for meritorious petitioners and curb
abuse of the mechanism).
124. See 142 CONG. REC. 7798 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“Unfortunately, the
Federal courts have gone too far in habeas corpus cases. These cases drag on for years, and
there is no end to them, as inmates, especially those on death row with nothing to lose, file
endless rounds of petitions.”). Later, after identifying a few examples of lengthy habeas review,
Senator Specter laments the fact that there are “over 4,550 petitions for Supreme Court review”
in 1986. Id.
125. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
126. See, e.g., In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (Rosenbaum & J. Pryor,
JJ., concurring).
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too likely. 127 There would be good reason to adopt the possible-reliance
standard at the jurisdictional stage if it successfully ferreted out meritless petitions without withholding relief from innocent persons.
B. The Shortcomings of Sole Reliance
This Section argues first that the sole-reliance standard is too high a bar
to impose on innocent petitioners at the jurisdictional stage because it promotes finality at the expense of protecting the innocent. Next, this Section
argues that the sole-reliance standard does not do as much to further finality
as its proponents suggest. Accordingly, to the extent that possible reliance
prioritizes innocence over finality, it does so with nominal costs to the presumption of finality. 128
First, the sole-reliance standard affords too much weight to the importance of finality. One of the hallmarks of collateral review is that the petitioner, at least initially, bears the burden of showing either that she is
innocent or that the final judgment entered in her case was otherwise erroneous. 129 That said, the evidentiary standard to which habeas petitioners are
held should reflect the difficulties inherent in making a showing of the particular claim they advance. The higher the likelihood of innocence, the
weaker the interest in finality. In the context of Johnson claims, sentencing
judges are not required to, and often do not, make it clear which ACCA provision they used to justify enhancing the petitioner’s sentence. 130 This makes
the petitioner’s success more difficult—if not impossible—for reasons beyond the petitioner’s control and makes a petitioner’s ability to satisfy sole
reliance a poor indicator of her legal innocence. The petitioner’s initial burden should be reduced to address these concerns.
Moreover, Johnson claims center on the sentencing court’s judicial construction of a statute. In these cases, which hinge on a court’s understanding
of the law rather than on the petitioner’s conduct, the Supreme Court has
weakened the presumption of finality by allowing lower courts to consider
cases decided after the petitioner’s sentencing to determine the statute’s
proper construction and the resulting outcome of the petitioner’s claim. 131
Courts permit the consideration of post-sentencing case law because the invalidation of criminal statutes “necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a
defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make crimi-

127. Id. (indicating that the possibility of error is exacerbated by the fact that circuit
judges “have little to go on and are instructed to perform a very limited function in the request-for-authorization stage”).
128. Cf. Baker, supra note 78 (relying exclusively on the interest in finality in advocating
for the preponderance standard).
129. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244–2255.
130. United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017).
131. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004); Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 618–21 (1998).
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nal.’ ” 132 Subsequent case law helps reviewing courts clarify what exactly the
law made criminal. This practice shows that the strength of finality varies
depending on the context. The ambiguous sentencing record in many Johnson claims supports a more permissive standard at the jurisdictional stage,
even if it weakens the presumption of finality.
Second, it is not clear that the sole-reliance standard does a better job
preserving the presumption of finality than the possible-reliance standard.
Finality is made stronger, and the distinction between collateral and direct
review clearer, when habeas petitioners bear a heavier burden at the jurisdictional stage. However, a less precise distinction between direct review and
collateral attack might still sufficiently promote finality. The Supreme Court
has been clear about when the presumption of finality attaches to a petitioner’s sentence, but the Court’s willingness to hear and resolve collateral attacks is less clear. 133 In contrast to criticisms by sole-reliance courts, the
possible-reliance standard does recognize the importance of finality in
judgment. The disagreement among the circuits is best understood as reflecting different views on the strength of the presumption of finality—not as
some circuits rejecting the importance of finality in judgment. 134
The criminal justice system’s goals of promoting deterrence and incapacitation also provide only weak support for the sole-reliance standard. Deterrence and incapacitation can only legitimize the punishment of those who
have committed wrongs validly identified by the law. 135 The circumstances
of innocent Johnson claimants are complicated by the fact that they have
committed wrongs validly identified by the law—the prior underlying offenses—whereas the legally innocent defendant has not committed an act
that the law has validly identified as deserving of an enhanced sentence. 136 To
recognize why deterrence and incapacitation cannot be legitimately advanced, it helps to recognize that “a defendant can be innocent of a noncapital sentence” just as they can be innocent of an offense. 137 While the
existence of an enhanced punishment deters and incapacitates for the underlying offense, the question presented by Johnson claims is whether the additional deterrence and incapacitation effect is created legitimately. A central
tenet of our justice system is that deterrence and incapacitation cannot be
legitimately advanced unless there is adequate notice. 138 For Johnson claimants, while there was adequate notice for the underlying offense, there was
inadequate notice for the enhanced sentence when it was predicated on the
residual clause. 139 Accordingly, the deterrent effect and term of incapacita132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305, 308 (1989); see Litman, supra note 27, at 433–35.
See supra Section II.B.
Litman, supra note 27, at 450.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Litman, supra note 27, at 452.
Litman, supra note 27, at 440 (citing Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016)).
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015).
See, e.g., id. at 2557–58.

November 2020]

Possible Reliance

445

tion assigned on the grounds of the underlying sentence are legitimate, but
any additional deterrent effect owing to the longer sentence is unjustified if
the enhanced sentence is grounded in the residual clause. Thus, the solereliance standard cannot legitimately serve those goals when it withholds relief from those with legitimate legal innocence claims under Johnson. 140 Requiring a petitioner to show that the sentencing judge relied solely on the
residual clause risks the continued incarceration of legally innocent individuals, and this cannot be justified on the basis that it furthers deterrence and
incapacitation.
Additionally, Johnson claims exert a minimal draw on judicial resources,
especially in comparison to other habeas claims. 141 There is no possibility of
retrial in Johnson claims as the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution prohibits retrying successful Johnson petitioners under any laws that have been
invalidated in the wake of Johnson or that were passed since their conviction. 142 In practice, courts manage to process a substantial number of Johnson claims, contrary to contentions that they clog the courts. 143 Moreover,
courts need only consider a fairly narrow range of evidence when deciding
Johnson claims. 144 Indeed, even in the circuits that consider post-sentencing
case law in examining alternative bases for the enhanced sentence, courts are
limited to the factual materials that were available to the sentencing judge
and subsequent case law. 145 Courts are permitted—not required—to consider post-sentencing case law.
Admittedly, some judicial resources are required for resentencing, as reviewing judges must determine the state of the law and analyze the petitioner’s claim accordingly. Still, the limited resources required to adjudicate a
Johnson claim limit the extent to which concerns about the conservation of
judicial resources can justify the sole-reliance standard. 146 Moreover, the defendant is still only entitled to resentencing if she can prove that the error
actually prejudiced her. 147
The sole-reliance standard is not necessary to preserve the traditional
distinction between collateral and direct review. The standard also makes it

140. See supra Section I.B.
141. See Litman, supra note 27, at 460–62.
142. Id. at 422; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10.
143. In re Jones, 830 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (Rosenbaum & J. Pryor, JJ., concurring) (indicating that the Eleventh Circuit processed 1,800 Johnson-based claims in 2016).
Some might suggest this shows that habeas is already a huge burden on courts. Part III addresses this argument and suggests this cost is worth tolerating because it is necessary to respect the importance of innocence.
144. See Litman, supra note 27, at 456–57.
145. E.g., United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 892, 897–98 (9th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 683 (4th Cir. 2017).
146. Litman, supra note 27, at 456.
147. Geozos, 870 F.3d at 897. A defendant is actually prejudiced if the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on her sentence or conviction. Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
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more likely that courts will fail to remedy constitutional violations by keeping legally innocent petitioners in prison. Finally, it does not substantially
decrease the draw on judicial resources. Thus, the justifications for the solereliance standard are weaker than advocates of the standard suggest.
C. The Possible-Reliance Standard Protects Innocent Johnson Claimants
Courts, academics, and practitioners have long maintained that the petitioner’s innocence, legal or factual, is a vital consideration in determining the
availability of collateral relief. 148 The AEDPA and Supreme Court jurisprudence establish a particular balance between innocence and finality. Unlike
the sole-reliance standard, the possible-reliance standard strikes this balance,
adequately protecting innocence and preserving finality.
While other scholars have advocated for similarly innocence-centered
reforms to the writ of habeas corpus in contexts beyond just Johnson
claims, 149 Professor Eve Brensike Primus’s work on equitable gateways plays
a particularly key role in this Section’s analysis. 150 Specifically, Primus argues
that there is a consistent equitable practice in federal habeas jurisprudence of
allowing petitioners to bypass the procedural obstacles imposed by the
AEDPA when “a state prisoner has not had a full and fair opportunity to
present his or her claims and have them fairly considered.” 151 Primus calls
these procedural concessions “equitable gateways” and argues that these equitable gateways should be broadened if federal habeas is to serve as an adequate check against fundamental unfairness. 152
This Section argues that the possible-reliance standard is consistent with
AEDPA’s language and then draws an analogy between one of the equitable
gateways Primus defends and the unique circumstances of Johnson claimants
with ambiguous or silent sentencing records. When a petitioner is entitled to

148. E.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235–36 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting);
Friendly, supra note 122, at 148 (proposing limiting habeas claims to only those with a colorable claim of innocence).
149. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 97, at 272. Many scholars provide additional arguments
in favor of expanding habeas by relaxing or eliminating procedural barriers to federal claimants who have shown a reasonable probability of innocence. See, e.g., Stephanie Roberts
Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT,
supra note 97, at 247 (outlining an “innocence track” on which a prisoner who establishes innocence by a preponderance of the evidence would be entitled to a blanket exemption from
procedural bars); Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting
Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011) (proposing an
approach where defendants who submit to and prevail in an investigative trial benefit from
greater freedom to raise habeas claims); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990).
150. Eve Brensike Primus, Equitable Gateways: Toward Expanded Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of State-Court Criminal Convictions, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2019).
151. Id. at 304.
152. Id. at 297.
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an equitable gateway through a procedural bar, the remedy is to develop the
evidentiary record. Courts should give Johnson claimants an analogous remedy by hearing the petitioner’s claim on the merits. This Section concludes
by showing that the possible-reliance standard does not allow too many petitioners to obtain merits review.
1.

Possible Reliance is Justified by Congressional Intent

Petitioners bringing Johnson claims are legally innocent if the sentencing
judge relied on the unconstitutionally vague residual clause of the ACCA. 153
If the sentencing record is ambiguous, petitioners that actually had their sentence enhanced under the residual clause will struggle to meet the solereliance standard at the jurisdictional stage, and thus, the sole-reliance
standard increases the risk of incarcerating innocent petitioners. The central
importance of a petitioner’s innocence in habeas proceedings makes this a
strong reason for a more permissive standard at the jurisdictional stage.
While there are some differences between a legally and factually innocent defendant, each is entitled to habeas relief because neither acted in violation of a valid criminal statute. 154 As such, the high costs associated with
imposing criminal sanctions on a legally innocent defendant cannot be justified any more than imposing sanctions on factually innocent defendants. 155
Federal courts have demonstrated sensitivity to these high costs by structuring habeas relief in a way to mitigate the cost of punishing the innocent. For
instance, judge-made law allows courts to hear procedurally defaulted claims
in cases where someone who is probably innocent has been convicted. 156 Regarding the AEDPA’s time bar, the Supreme Court allows the one-year limitation period to be tolled for equitable reasons 157 and the excuse of
petitioners who make “a convincing showing of actual innocence” from
compliance with the time bar. 158
In the AEDPA, Congress established a threshold showing of innocence
that would exempt petitioners from the act’s time bar and bar on successive
petitions. 159 Accordingly, it is critical to determine whether possible reliance
lets petitioners who have not shown a sufficiently high likelihood of inno-

153. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
154. Litman, supra note 27, at 448–49.
155. See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1112, 1121–22 (2015) (arguing that the dynamic consequences of Blackstone’s principle—it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer—“makes some innocent defendants worse off,” as society understands conviction as a stronger indicator of
guilt).
156. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
157. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010).
158. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386–87 (2013).
159. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254.
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cence bring meritless habeas proceedings. 160 Congressional intent is fairly
clear on the policy issues implicated by this issue. For one, Congress has indicated that the discovery of a new constitutional right would provide good
grounds for weakening the presumption of finality. 161 The AEDPA contains
exceptions to the procedural bars for petitioners whose claims are based on
retroactive rules of constitutional law or facts that could not have been discovered previously through due diligence. 162 These exceptions suggest that
the Act was meant to strengthen finality to the extent consistent with preserving innocent petitioners’ ability to recover—not to strengthen finality at
any cost. 163 Had Congress intended finality to be conclusive, it would have
required petitioners to make more than a “substantial showing of the denial
of a federal right” in appealing a final order in a habeas proceeding. 164 Thus,
implementing possible reliance at the jurisdictional stage is consistent with
Congress’ intent as expressed in the AEDPA.
The Court’s interpretation of the AEDPA in Welch shows that Johnson
claimants are entitled to an equitable gateway through the otherwise strict
procedural bar on successive or untimely habeas motions. 165 An analogy between jurisprudence on equitable gateways and the possible-reliance standard supports the claim that possible reliance achieves the appropriate
balance between innocence and finality. Jurisprudence on equitable gateways
shows courts exempt habeas petitioners who show a high enough possibility
of innocence from procedural bars. 166 In some cases the petitioners have
provided new positive evidence that was not uncovered despite their due diligence at trial. 167 In others, petitioners show that they did not have a fair opportunity to litigate their federal claims on the merits at the state level. 168 In
both instances, equitable gateways are justified using the emphasis the criminal justice system places on innocence. Procedural requirements in habeas
review aim to conserve judicial resources without increasing the likelihood
of wrongful conviction, but the particularly stringent procedural limits in

160. 142 CONG. REC. 7792 (1996) (statement of Sen. Warner) (suggesting the AEDPA
successfully ensured “defendants retain very reasonable access to Federal courts to prove their
innocence”).
161. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
162. See, e.g., id. § 2244(b)(2).
163. See, e.g., id. § 2255(f) (relaxing the one-year procedural filing requirement when unconstitutional government action impeding the petitioner’s motion is removed and facts supporting innocence have been discovered after direct review despite the petitioner’s due
diligence).
164. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995).
165. Id.
166. See Primus, supra note 150.
167. Id. at 299.
168. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010); Primus, supra note 150, at 312.
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habeas are predicated on the assumption that the initial trial and direct review process were executed fairly. 169
2.

Possible Reliance Comports with Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Beyond comporting with congressional intent expressed in the AEDPA,
the possible-reliance standard is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on due process and equitable gateways. For instance, requiring habeas
petitioners to adhere to the sole-reliance standard treats similarly situated
people differently. 170 Two petitioners who committed the same criminal act
and had the same previous criminal conviction might receive different results on habeas review solely because one petitioner’s sentencing judge made
it more clear that she relied solely on the residual clause. 171 As judges are not
required to clearly identify which provision of the ACCA grounds the enhanced sentence, the difference between these petitioners is arbitrary.
The Ninth Circuit extends the Stromberg principle to resolve this issue. 172 Under the Stromberg principle, a general verdict in a multiclaim suit
that contains an erroneously submitted claim cannot be upheld because it
violates the claimant’s right to due process. 173 In Stromberg v. California, the
defendant was convicted for displaying a red flag in a public space in violation of a Red Scare-era California statute. 174 The trial court instructed the jury to convict Stromberg if they found that she displayed the flag as an
“emblem of opposition to organized government . . . an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action, or . . . in aid to propaganda that is of a seditious
character.” 175 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the “opposition to
organized government” clause was unconstitutionally vague on its face. 176
Because the jury returned a general verdict after being instructed to convict
if the defendant violated any of the three clauses, the Court set aside Stromberg’s conviction. 177
As the Ninth Circuit indicated in Geozos, the issues in Stromberg are
analogous to those presented by Johnson petitioners. 178 In Stromberg, the jury verdict was ambiguous with respect to which clause provided the basis for
the petitioner’s conviction. 179 Similarly, for Johnson claimants, the sentenc-

169.
(1982).
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436–37 (2000); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126
E.g., United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2017).
E.g., id.
Id. at 896.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931).
Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 359, 370.
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id.
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ing record is ambiguous as to whether the enumerated-offense clause, the
elements clause, or the residual clause supported the enhanced sentence.
One petitioner may easily prevail under the more difficult showing required
by the sole-reliance standard because her sentencing judge made clear that
the residual clause provided the sole ground for her enhanced sentence. Another may fail to satisfy the same standard because the sentencing judge
failed to unambiguously specify the grounds for sentencing enhancement. It
was not feasible to determine which of the three clauses the jury in Stromberg
relied on, so the solution in Stromberg was to vacate the judgment. However,
sentencing decisions in Johnson cases rest largely on legal conclusions. Accordingly, Johnson cases should be resolved by requiring judges to adjudicate
the merits of the petitioner’s claim. 180
Allowing Johnson claimants who have demonstrated that the grounds
for their enhanced sentence are ambiguous to proceed with their claims ensures due process because courts are better positioned to ensure that different outcomes for Johnson claimants turn on legally relevant differences—i.e.,
the existence of alternative, legitimate grounds for an enhanced sentence—
by conducting a review on the merits. Advocates of the sole-reliance standard suggest it is necessary to ensure finality. However, the finality-related
benefits cited by the standard’s proponents are less valuable in the context of
Johnson claims. Accordingly, the strong countervailing interest in protecting
innocence and the right to due process defeats these justifications and militates in favor of a lower standard.
Furthermore, Professor Primus identifies equitable gateways in habeas
corpus jurisprudence and suggests that courts are often willing to depart
from procedural and substantive restrictions on habeas petitions. 181 While
Primus primarily contemplates cases where failures in state courts have unfairly inhibited the petitioner’s access to habeas relief, 182 such cases are analogous to the omissions made by federal sentencing judges in Johnson claims.
Primus discusses cases in which the Supreme Court decided that, because a
petitioner’s due diligence at trial was thwarted, the reviewing court should
grant a new evidentiary hearing. 183 For instance, in Williams v. Taylor, the
Supreme Court found that a petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because evidence providing the factual basis for the petitioner’s claims was
not “reasonably available to petitioner’s counsel during state habeas proceedings.” 184 Despite the petitioner’s diligence, he was not put on notice about
the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct and therefore could not develop
an evidentiary record for this defense. 185 When the remedy for an equitable

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id.
Primus, supra note 150, at 291.
Id. at 293.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 444 (2000).
Id. at 442.
Id.
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gateway is a new trial, the state must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at the retrial.
Like petitioners in circumstances described in Williams, Johnson claimants were unable to develop their sentencing record because of “the conduct
of another or by happenstance.” 186 In the case of Johnson claimants, the sentencing “court’s discretionary choice not to specify under which clause of
Section 924(e)(2)(B) an offense qualified as a violent felony” is out of their
control. 187 Further, a defendant certainly has no control over the constitutionality of the provision under which she was sentenced. The appropriate
remedy, according to equitable-gateway jurisprudence, is to allow for the development of the evidentiary record. This requires hearing their claim on the
merits, as Johnson claimants are no more in control of the evidentiary record
when making the jurisdictional showing that their claim relies on Johnson
than they were at the time of their sentencing. 188 Reviewing courts should
conduct the analysis the sentencing court would have had to complete had
they known the residual clause was unconstitutional—namely, whether the
elements or enumerated-offense clause could support an enhanced sentence.
Adopting the sole-reliance standard would be equivalent to withholding an
evidentiary hearing in cases, like Williams, where the defendant could not
have discovered the trial error, despite his diligent efforts to develop the evidentiary record. 189 The Supreme Court has deemed cases like Williams well
worth the judicial resources spent holding an entirely new trial. If Williams
cases are worth the resources, resentencing in Johnson cases should be, too.
After all, Johnson claims can be resolved with a closed-record review that expends far fewer judicial resources.
Finally, adjudicating Johnson claims uses up less of the court’s resources
than most examples in the equitable-gateway context, supporting the possible-reliance standard. In most equitable-gateways cases, the burden is increased by the need for a new trial and is completely shifted back onto the
state. 190 In contrast, as only legal issues need to be resolved, judges are likely
to be both more comfortable and more efficient when reviewing the merits
of Johnson claims. 191
This Note suggests that enforcing the possible-reliance standard at the
jurisdictional stage comports with the practice of reserving equitable gateways for those that advance a colorable claim of innocence. 192 Executing
merits review for petitioners who satisfy the possible-reliance standard at the
jurisdictional stage prevents a judge’s arbitrary decision about whether to

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 432.
United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017).
Williams, 529 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 442–43.
See supra notes 181–185 and accompanying text.
Litman, supra note 27, at 453–54.
See Primus, supra note 150, at 293.
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specify which ACCA clause supported the sentence from determining
whether a Johnson claimant will be freed.
3.

Possible Reliance Does Not Let Too Many Petitioners Proceed to Merits
Review

The key arguments against the possible-reliance standard assert that it
disregards legislative intent expressed in the AEDPA by eroding finality. But
again, the importance of finality must not be overstated, as the AEDPA recognizes actual innocence as a key countervailing concern. 193 Proponents of
the sole-reliance standard overvalue finality. 194 They suggest that allowing a
showing of possible reliance “to establish subject matter jurisdiction for petitioners’ collateral claims subjects the courts to entertaining petitions for collateral relief that would not survive a full examination of their merits.” 195
One issue with this claim is that it conflates the jurisdictional and merits
stages. If only those claims that could “survive a full examination of their
merits” made it past the jurisdictional stage, there would be no purpose for
the merits stage, as only actually meritorious claims would be considered on
their merits. 196 This approach risks dismissing meritorious claims at the jurisdictional stage in favor of ensuring that only those that will prevail advance to the merits, and it is unrealistic about courts’ ability to identify
meritorious claims this early in the proceedings.
Additionally, proponents of sole reliance claim that the AEDPA seeks to
preserve judicial resources and that adopting possible reliance at the jurisdictional stage would contravene Congress’s intent. 197 This counterargument
carries weight only if (1) the possible-reliance standard lets nonmeritorious
petitions through to the merits stage; (2) these petitions would be dismissed
at the jurisdictional stage if we enforced a higher standard; and (3) this higher standard would not deny relief to actually innocent petitioners. In the
past, the Supreme Court has treated the risk of punishing the actually innocent as sufficient justification for equitable concessions. 198 As the possiblereliance standard requires proof by the preponderance of the evidence, the
burden is high enough to disincentivize nonmeritorious claims.

193. Supra Section III.C.1.
194. See, e.g., Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Baker,
supra note 78, at 210.
195. See Baker, supra note 78, at 210. Baker mischaracterizes possible reliance as something “less than a preponderance.” Id.
196. Cf. United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 235 n.21 (3d Cir. 2018).
197. Dimott, 881 F.3d at 242.
198. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent
with the Constitution.”); United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 726 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he government has no legitimate interest in punishing those
innocent of wrongdoing.”); supra Section III.C.2.
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Still, another potential shortcoming of the possible-reliance standard
must be considered: Does possible-reliance permit too many meritless claims
to proceed to the merits stage? The main reason for different standards at
different stages is to cut down on the number of nonmeritorious claims that
make it past the jurisdiction gate, and then to distinguish apparently meritorious claims from actually meritorious claims with more searching review on
the merits. Congressional intent and Supreme Court jurisprudence militate
in favor of a more permissive standard at the jurisdictional stage because,
even post-AEDPA, the federal habeas statutes seek to protect innocent petitioners. This is illustrated by the AEDPA’s exceptions to the one-year time
bar and the bar on successive motions. 199 Requiring a showing of sole reliance at the jurisdictional stage risks closing these equitable gateways by setting a standard that many legally innocent petitioners cannot satisfy. 200
Subsequent jurisprudence suggests petitioners that can satisfy the possible-reliance standard have established a sufficiently robust claim of innocence to warrant merits review. The court’s decision in Welch made Johnson
claims retroactively applicable on review and therefore eligible for this statutorily established equitable gateway. 201 In Welch, the Court found that Johnson created a new substantive constitutional right insofar as its invalidation
“alter[ed] the range of conduct or the class of persons” that were punished
under the ACCA sentencing enhancement provisions. 202 It adopted a fairly
permissive view of the kinds of arguments worth considering on the merits
by recognizing that “the parties continue to dispute whether Welch’s strongarm robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the elements
clause of the Act.” 203 So while the case’s resolution on the merits remained
an open question, Welch’s claim of legal innocence was sufficiently strong to
warrant review on the merits—despite the fact that on remand the Court of
Appeals might have “determine[d] on other grounds that the District Court
was correct to deny Welch’s motion to amend his sentence.” 204 That said, the
Court was unequivocal in its statement that Welch passed the jurisdictional
bar. 205 Accordingly, Welch clearly indicates that the interest in finality is defeated if the petitioner makes a sufficient showing of innocence (i.e., she
properly relies on Johnson).

199. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(f).
200. See United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017).
201. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
202. Id. at 1264–65 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)).
203. Id. at 1268.
204. While the court stated that “reasonable jurists at least could debate whether Welch is
entitled to relief,” because there was no debate about whether Welch relied on Johnson, the area
for reasonable debate can only be properly focused on the merits of his claim. Id. The alternative grounds referred to here are the elements and force clauses.
205. Id. (“Johnson announced a substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on
collateral review.”).
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CONCLUSION
The possible-reliance/sole-reliance distinction put forth in this Note
more accurately captures the circuits’ disagreement than the preponderance/nonpreponderance distinction. Furthermore, implementing the possible-reliance standard at the jurisdictional stage and the sole-reliance
standard at the merits stage achieves the balance between innocence and finality contemplated by Congress and enshrined in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding equitable gateways. The minimal burden placed on the
courts by enforcing a lower standard—thereby permitting more petitioners
to have their claims heard on the merits—is a reasonable price to pay for adequately protecting innocence. Despite the general trend toward restricting
the availability of habeas relief through procedural bars, this Note joins the
robust countermovement in courts and the academic discourse toward a
greater respect for legal innocence. Should the Supreme Court address the
circuit split, endorsing the approach advanced by this Note would be an unequivocal statement that the great writ of liberty is still available to the innocent.

